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During October–December 2015, 29 patients in a hospital in 
the Netherlands acquired nosocomial infection with a mul-
tidrug-resistant, New Delhi-metallo-β-lactamase–positive 
Klebsiella pneumoniae strain. Extensive infection control 
measures were needed to stop this outbreak. The estimat-
ed economic impact of the outbreak was $804,263; highest 
costs were associated with hospital bed closures.
In 2008, New Delhi-metallo-β-lactamase (NDM), an enzyme that confers bacteria with resistance to a range 
of antimicrobial drugs, was detected for the first time in 
a patient from Sweden during a trip to India (1). Subse-
quently, NDM-producing isolates rapidly spread and have 
been found dispersed throughout the world. However, in 
western and northern Europe, identification of patients with 
NDM-producing Enterobacteriaceae is uncommon (2). In-
fections with multidrug-resistant, gram-negative bacteria 
are a concern worldwide, given restricted treatment options 
and excess costs of care (3,4). 
During October 1–December 30, 2015, an outbreak 
of Klebsiella pneumoniae containing an NDM-1 plasmid 
affected 29 patients residing in Jeroen Bosch Hospital (’s-
Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands), a 683-bed tertiary teach-
ing hospital. This hospital outbreak started in a surgical 
ward. On November 23, 2015, NDM-producing extended-
spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)–positive K. pneumoniae 
bacteria were cultured and isolated from surgical drain flu-
id. At the time of identification, the patient was already dis-
charged. Shortly thereafter, screening cultures of long-term 
admitted surgical patients revealed 2 additional patients 
with NDM-producing K. pneumoniae. Contact tracing and 
weekly screening rounds of all in-hospital patients were 
performed, identifying additional NDM carriers. Weekly 
screening rounds revealed 7 wards with uncontrolled NDM 
transmission (i.e., >2 NDM carriers). On the basis of an 
epidemiologic curve of the NDM carriers detected, all 
patients admitted to 1 of these wards beginning October 
1 were defined as at risk of carrying NDM. Because the 
policy that was chosen was search and destroy (detect pa-
tients as quickly as possible and isolate them to protect the 
others), all patients residing in high-risk wards were tested.
Six months after the start of the outbreak, 2,964 pa-
tients had been flagged as at-risk patients; >95% of these 
patients had been screened, and a total of 29 NDM carri-
ers were identified. No risk factors, such as recent travel 
abroad or a common source of transmission, were identified 
among the cases of this outbreak. In 2016, weekly screen-
ing rounds were continued in wards with at-risk popula-
tions to confirm the outbreak was successfully controlled.
Apart from the physical burden to patients and hos-
pitals caused by multidrug-resistant microorganisms, 
nosocomial outbreaks also entail an economic burden. 
Estimates of the cost of outbreaks of multidrug-resistant 
bacteria in healthcare institutions are scarce. Insight on 
outbreak costs can help to justify the necessary invest-
ments in infection prevention and control measures, fa-
cilitating the decision-making process on prevention and 
control policy. In this study, we assessed the total costs of 
this outbreak on the basis of interviews and data from the 
affected hospital.
The Study
The outbreak occurred in a hospital with 683 registered 
beds, including a separate rehabilitation center. We as-
sessed outbreak-related costs by using an activity-based 
costing model and performed interviews with staff working 
in the hospital to gather additional information about out-
break control activities performed and costs (online Techni-
cal Appendix, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/23/9/16-
1710-Techapp1.pdf). We calculated hospital costs from 
October 1, 2015, the beginning of the outbreak, through 
January 31, 2016, one month after the end of the outbreak, 
when the greater part of costs had been made. We divided 
outbreak costs into diagnostics costs, ward-related costs, 
and other outbreak-related control measure costs. All costs 
are expressed as 2015 US dollars and Euros. Euros were 
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converted to US dollars by using the data on the purchasing 
power parity of the Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (https://data.oecd.org/conversion/
purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm): €1 = US $1.23.
The laboratory of the hospital performed diagnostic 
tests (bacteria cultures and PCR tests) and antimicrobial 
drug susceptibility testing for patients. All PCR tests were 
performed in batches. Items that were included in the de-
termination of the costs of diagnostics were testing materi-
als, procedures, and laboratory personnel. Personnel time 
of the microbiologists was valued by multiplying the time 
spent on laboratory and outbreak management activities, as 
quoted during the interviews, by unit costs per hour, taken 
from Dutch guidelines for economic evaluations (5).
We retrieved loss of revenues caused by closed beds 
after the outbreak from the hospital database and list pric-
es online (5) and adjusted this number for the occupancy 
rate of the hospital, which was 85% on average. The ex-
tra expenses for personal protective equipment (disposable 
aprons, gloves, and masks) and cleaning the wards affected 
by the outbreak were gathered by the department of techni-
cal and facility services.
We also included costs associated with the additional 
time spent by healthcare workers on patient isolation. Fol-
lowing Wassenberg et al., we assumed 30 min/d for nurs-
es and 10 min/d for physicians as the time required for ad-
hering to control measures (6). The infection prevention 
expert provided the number of staff meetings in which 
outbreak interventions were discussed and the number 
of employees participating in these meetings. Both the 
executive manager and the communication manager pro-
vided data on the amount of time associated with outbreak 
response activities. Finally, other costs included costs for 
sending test kits to persons who had been hospitalized in 
the outbreak period.
We estimated total outbreak costs at $804,263 or 
€653,801 (Table), corresponding to a cost of $27,700 per 
patient. The loss of revenues due to of closure of beds con-
tributed the most to the total costs. Other cost drivers were 
diagnostic tests and personnel time spent by laboratory em-
ployees and infection prevention experts.
Conclusions
The NDM-1 outbreak at Jeroen Bosch Hospital in the Neth-
erlands in 2015 was associated with substantial costs in-
curred by the hospital, estimated at $804,263 or €653,801, 
which was 12% of the total budget allocated that year 
for medical microbiology and infection prevention, and 
$27,700 per patient. Blocked beds had the highest effect on 
the total costs, followed by staff time targeted at infection 
prevention activities.
A few studies have evaluated outbreak costs in hos-
pitals; however, none of these were targeted at NDM 
outbreaks. Compared with other studies on the costs of 
hospital outbreaks with other pathogens, such as Acineto-
bacter baumanni (7,8), norovirus (9), ESBL-producing 
K. pneumoniae (9), and Enterococcus faecium (9), our 
estimates are higher. One major factor explaining this dif-
ference was the testing of a relatively high number of pa-
tients; the closure of beds was the main cost driver in all 
applicable studies.
Despite being substantial, the cost we calculated for 
the outbreak is an underestimate. At least 9 NDM-1–
positive patients and 28 other patients were discharged 
 
Table. Total outbreak costs stratified by type of cost, Jeroen Bosch hospital, the Netherlands, Oct 2015–Jan 2016* 





Diagnostics    
 Other laboratory personnel Estimated 2,517 h† 93,789 76,251 
 Microbiological tests Material costs to perform cultures in batches 60,070 48,837 
 Microbiologists Estimated 376 h† 46,017 37,412 
 Molecular diagnostics Material costs to perform PCRs in batches 24,523 19,937 
  Subtotal diagnostics  224,399 182,437 
Ward-related costs    
 No. blocked beds 582 beds, occupancy rate 0.85 at $550/d or €447/d (5) 272,085 221,131 
 Personal protective equipment Expenditures for extra disposable aprons, gloves, and masks 55,121 44,814 
 Cleaning wards Purchase of 2 fogging devices and personnel time for extra cleaning 46,881 38,115 
  Subtotal ward-related costs  374,087 304,060 
Other outbreak control costs    
 Infection prevention experts Estimated 2,336 h for internal advice and guidance† 105,356 85,655 
 Patients in isolation 280 patients, averaged at 5.2 d of hospitalization, at $31.40/d or 
€25.53/d (6) 
45,718 37,172 
 Staff meetings 23 staff meetings with on average 21 participants  0.75 h  $1,525/h† 26,306 21,390 
 Communication 320 h for internal and patient-related communication spent by several 
communication employees† 
17,696 14,387 
 Costs for mailings  10,701 8,700 
  Subtotal outbreak control costs  205,777 167,304 
Total costs  804,263 653,801 
*Resource use related to this outbreak was provided by the hospital. 
†Labor costs/h were determined by using the Dutch manual for economic evaluations (5). 
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to a long-term care facility, resulting in additional in-
fection control measures and costs that were not taken 
into account for this report. In addition, a medical doc-
tor, infection prevention expert, and infectious diseases 
nurse of the Municipal Health Service spent 95 h, 65 
h, and 30 h, respectively, on the outbreak, accounting 
for $9,551 additional costs. Furthermore, phylogenetic 
molecular methods were performed at the National In-
stitute of Public Health to confirm the outbreak. Finally, 
we only calculated the outbreak costs through January 
31, 2016, but additional costs probably were incurred 
after this date.
As shown in this study, the expansion of multidrug-
resistant, gram-negative bacteria is of great concern; these 
bacteria both threaten patient safety and increase health-
care costs. The intensive outbreak control measures of 
the hospital were costly and inconvenient for patients and 
staff. In countries where NDM-1–positive K. pneumoniae 
is not endemic, early detection of colonized patients and 
adequate infection prevention control strategies will be 
key factors in minimizing the spread of multidrug-resis-
tant bacteria.
Dr. Mollers is a policy advisor for the Department of  
Preparedness and Response at the Centre for Infectious  
Diseases of the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment. She is also part of the European Programme 
for Intervention Epidemiology Training fellowship program. 
She is interested in the public health response to and  
epidemiology of communicable diseases.
References
  1. Yong D, Toleman MA, Giske CG, Cho HS, Sundman K, Lee K,  
et al. Characterization of a new metallo-beta-lactamase gene, 
blaNDM-1, and a novel erythromycin esterase gene carried on a 
unique genetic structure in Klebsiella pneumoniae sequence type 
14 from India. Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 2009;53:5046–54. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/AAC.00774-09
  2. Glasner C, Albiger B, Buist G, Tambić Andrasević A, Canton R,  
Carmeli Y, et al.; European Survey on Carbapenemase-Producing 
Enterobacteriaceae (EuSCAPE) Working Group. Carbapenemase- 
producing Enterobacteriaceae in Europe: a survey among national  
experts from 39 countries, February 2013. Euro Surveill. 2013;  
18:20525. http://dx.doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES2013.18.28.20525
  3. Giske CG, Monnet DL, Cars O, Carmeli Y; ReAct-Action on 
Antibiotic Resistance. Clinical and economic impact of common 
multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacilli. Antimicrob Agents 
Chemother. 2008;52:813–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/
AAC.01169-07
  4. Levy SB, Marshall B. Antibacterial resistance worldwide: causes, 
challenges and responses. Nat Med. 2004;10(Suppl):S122–9.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nm1145
  5. Zorginstituut Nederland. Guidance for carrying out economic 
evaluations in healthcare [in Dutch]. Amsterdam: Zorginstituut 
Nederland; 2015.
  6. Wassenberg MW, Kluytmans JA, Box AT, Bosboom RW,  
Buiting AG, van Elzakker EP, et al. Rapid screening of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus using PCR and chromogenic agar: 
a prospective study to evaluate costs and effects. Clin Microbiol 
Infect. 2010;16:1754–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
0691.2010.03210.x
  7. Ayraud-Thévenot S, Huart C, Mimoz O, Taouqi M, Laland C, 
Bousseau A, et al. Control of multi-drug-resistant Acinetobacter 
baumannii outbreaks in an intensive care unit: feasibility and  
economic impact of rapid unit closure. J Hosp Infect. 2012;82:290–
2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2012.08.016
  8. Jiang Y, Resch S, Liu X, Rogers SO Jr, Askari R, Klompas M,  
et al. The cost of responding to an Acinetobacter outbreak in  
critically ill surgical patients. Surg Infect (Larchmt). 2016; 
17:58–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/sur.2015.036
  9. Dik JW, Dinkelacker AG, Vemer P, Lo-Ten-Foe JR, Lokate M, 
Sinha B, et al. Cost-analysis of seven nosocomial outbreaks  
in an academic hospital. PLoS One. 2016;11:e0149226.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0149226
Address for correspondence: Anita W.M. Suijkerbuijk, Antonie van 
Leeuwenhoeklaan 9, 3720 BA, Bilthoven, the Netherlands; email:  
anita.suijkerbuijk@rivm.nl
Manage your email alerts so you only 
receive content of interest to you.
Sign up for an online subscription:  
wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/subscribe.htm
